Throughout the past 50 years, Lower Bucks County DAV Chapter #117's leadership and its members have never failed to remember their primary objective: to come to the aid of veterans and to be an active service organization within the community it serves. I commend DAV Chapter #117 for its continued leadership, and I wish it all the best as it enters its next 50 years of service.

PAWNEE SESQUICENTENNIAL RECOGNITION

HON. JOHN SHIMKUS

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 10, 2004

Mr. SHIMKUS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay special tribute to the Village of Pawnee, Illinois, as they celebrate their sesquicentennial. Established in 1854, the people of Pawnee have prospered while giving so much to this great nation.

In the middle of the 19th century, the Village of Pawnee started as a settlement at the bottom of a hill next to a creek in central Illinois. In the past, the small town boasted its own coalmine and railroad. Pawnee's earliest inhabitants were farmers, coalminers, common folk, and businessmen. Today, because of its outstanding school system, churches, and low crime rate, the town has blossomed into a village of 2,800 residents.

I am proud to represent the great people of the Village of Pawnee and to share in this special occasion with them. I thank them for all they give to this great nation and I wish them many successes in the years to come. Congratulations!

For those today who don't know enough about Pawnee, Illinois I have included this brief history of the town by Skip Minder:

''Justus Henkle and his family were the first Pawnee area settlers, arriving in the middle of March, 1818. They were followed by other early settlers, many of who settled at the bottom of a hill next to a creek, thus assuring a water supply.

The small settlement became known as the Horse Creek Settlement. In 1854, it petitioned the U.S. Post Office Department for a post office. The Post Office Department did not like the Horse Creek Settlement name and arbitrarily changed it to Pawnee, and so it has been from that time forward.

The Village of Pawnee was incorporated on November 9, 1891, and was and is still governed by a Village President and six Village Trustees.

In its early days the town boasted its own coalmine, the Horse Creek Coal Company, which later became the Peabody Coal Company Mine #5, and its own railroad known as the Pawnee Railroad. That railroad was the forerunner of the current Chicago and Illinois Midland Railroad (C&IM).

One of Pawnee's inhabitants was a man named Edward A. Baxter (1847–1934). At age 14, he enlisted in Indiana as a Union soldier during the Civil War along with six of his brothers. They became known as the ''seven fighting Baxter brothers''. All survived the war.

In 1865, young soldier, Ed Baxter, stood in the honor guard at the head of Abraham Lincoln's casket during funeral services for Lincoln in Indianapolis, Indiana. Lincoln's body was then transported to Springfield, Illinois for burial. Later, Baxter came to Pawnee in the summer of 1870 and remained until his death in 1934.

Another prominent citizen was Harry Howland Mason (1873–1946). He was the publisher of the Pawnee Herald newspaper until he was elected to the U.S. Congress in 1934 as Representative for the 21st Congressional District.

Pawnee's earliest inhabitants were farmers, and later farmers and coal miners, common folk, and businessmen. Today it has blossomed into a village of 2,800 residents. Rather than growth in its business and agricultural areas, growth is attributed to its outstanding school system, churches, and low crime rate. Many residents choose to reside in Pawnee and commute to their employment in other communities.

In June of this year it will celebrate its sesquicentennial, 150 years of being. It looks forward to at least 150 more years!''

BLIND INTO BAGHDAD

HON. DAVID R. OBEY

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 10, 2004

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, anyone interested in why there has been such chaos in post-war Iraq needs to read the article I am inserting in the RECORD by James Fallows which appeared in the most recent issue of the Atlantic Monthly.

[From the Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2004]

BLIND INTO BAGHDAD

(By James Fallows)

On a Friday afternoon last November, I met Douglas Feith in his office at the Pentagon to discuss what has happened in Iraq. Feith's title is undersecretary of defense for policy, which places him, along with several other undersecretaries, just below Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz in the Pentagon's hierarchy. Informally he is seen in Washington as ''Wolfowitz's Wolfowitz''—that is, as a deputy who has a wide range of responsibilities but is clearly identified with one particular policy. That policy is bringing regime change to Iraq—a goal that both Wolfowitz and Feith strongly advocated through the 1990s. To opponents of the war in Iraq, Feith is one of several shadowy, Rasputinlike figures who are shaping U.S. policy. He is seen much the way enemies of the Clinton Administration saw Hillary Clinton. Others associated with the Bush Administration who are seen this way include the consultant Richard Perle; Lewis ''Scooter'' Libby, the chief of staff for Vice President Dick Cheney; and the Vice President himself. What these officials have in common is their presumably great private influence and—even in the case of the Vice President—their limited public visibility and accountability.

In person Douglas Feith is nothing like Rasputin. Between a Reagan-era stint in the Pentagon and his current job he was a Washington lawyer for fifteen years, and he answered my questions with a lawyer's affability in the face of presumed disagreement. I could be biased in Feith's favor, because he was the most senior Administration official who granted my request for an interview about postwar Iraq. Like Donald Rumsfeld, Feith acts and sounds younger than many others of his age (fifty). But distinctly unlike Rumsfeld at a press conference, Feith in this interview did not seem at all arrogant or testy. His replies were relatively candid and unforced, in contrast to the angry or relentlessly on-message responses that have become standard from senior Administration officials. He acknowledged what was ''becoming the conventional wisdom'' about the Administration's failure to plan adequately for events after the fall of Baghdad, and then explained—with animation, dramatic pauses, and gestures—why he thought it was wrong.

Feith offered a number of specific illustrations of what he considered underappreciated successes. Some were familiar—the oil wells weren't on fire, Iraqis didn't starve or flee—but others were less so. For instance, he described the Administration's careful effort to replace old Iraqi dinars, which carried Saddam Hussein's image (''It's interesting how important that is, and it ties into the whole issue of whether people think that Saddam might be coming back''), with a new form of currency, without causing a run on the currency.

But mainly he challenged the premise of most critics: that the Administration could have done a better job of preparing for the consequences of victory. When I asked what had gone better than expected, and what had gone worse, he said, ''We don't exactly deal in 'expectations.' Expectations are too close to 'predictions.' We're not comfortable with predictions. It is one of the big strategic premises of the work that we do.''

The limits of future knowledge, Feith said, were of special importance to Rumsfeld, ''who is death to predictions.'' ''His big strategic theme is uncertainty,'' Feith said. ''The need to deal strategically with uncertainty. The inability to predict the future. The limits on our knowledge and the limits on our intelligence.''

In practice, Feith said, this meant being ready for whatever proved to be the situation in postwar Iraq. ''You will not find a single piece of paper . . . . If anybody ever went through all of our records—and someday some people will, presumably—nobody will find a single piece of paper that says, 'Mr. Secretary or Mr. President, let us tell you what postwar Iraq is going to look like, and here is what we need plans for.' If you tried that, you would get thrown out of Rumsfeld's office so fast—if you ever went in there and said,'Let me tell you what something's going to look like in the future,' you wouldn't get to your next sentence!''

''This is an important point,'' he said, ''because of this issue of What did we believe? . . . . The common line is, nobody planned for security because Ahmed Chalabi told us that everything was going to be swell.'' Chalabi, the exiled leader of the Iraqi National Congress, has often been blamed for making rosy predictions about the ease of governing postwar Iraq. ''So we predicted that everything was going to be swell, and we didn't plan for things not being swell.'' Here Feith paused for a few seconds, raised his hands with both palms up, and put on a ''Can you believe it?'' expression. ''I mean—one would really have to be a simpleton. And whatever people think of me, how can anybody think that Don Rumsfeld is that dumb? He's so evidently not that dumb, that how can people write things like that?'' He sounded amazed rather than angry.

No one contends that Donald Rumsfeld, or Paul Wolfowitz, or Douglas Feith, or the Administration as a whole is dumb. The wisdom of their preparations for the aftermath of military victory in Iraq is the question. Feith's argument was a less defensive-sounding version of the Administration's general response to criticisms of its postwar policy: Life is uncertain, especially when the lid